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tax notes state
On Yang’s Proposed Federal Tax
On Subnational Tax Incentives
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
To begin with, the text of Yang’s released
1
proposal is short, so it is worth quoting in full:
The recent circus surrounding Amazon’s
HQ2 project should highlight how
damaging the practice of allowing
localities to “bid” for investment from
corporations can be to our country, and
how important it is for us to find a
solution to this problem.
You can’t blame the corporation for
trying to save money, and you can’t
blame the localities for trying to attract
investment and new jobs. Because no one
has an incentive to stop this practice, it
continues unabated.

David Gamage is a professor of law at
Indiana University’s Maurer School of Law,
and Darien Shanske is a professor at the
University of California, Davis, School of Law
(King Hall).
In this installment of Academic
Perspectives on SALT, the authors discuss
presidential candidate Andrew Yang’s
proposal to tax subnational tax incentives for
companies at a rate of 100 percent.

However, it amounts to up to $90 billion
a year of tax breaks and cash grants.
Since states and other localities can’t run
a deficit or print money, these subsidies
amount to money that could otherwise
go to school, road repair, and other
important functions. These incentives
are meant to steal jobs and investment from
other states, not from offshoring or to
entice businesses to expand when they
otherwise wouldn’t.

Democratic presidential candidate Andrew
Yang recently announced a new proposal to —
in his campaign’s words — “end bidding wars
for corporate relocation.”
Even though Yang probably will not win the
primary, we think that his proposal is still worth
taking seriously, in part because we have heard
similar proposals floated by other politicians
over the last couple of years, including by
current members of Congress. We thus expect to
see similar proposals in the future, regardless of
what happens with Yang’s candidacy.

There’s also evidence that corporations
start with an idea of where they want to
move and then use a public bidding war
to get tax breaks from those locations.
Considering Amazon’s business, D.C.
and N.Y. were likely locations for HQ2
even before they received 238 proposals
from cities across the country.

1

Friends of Andrew Yang, “End Bidding Wars for Corporate
Relocation” (emphasis in original).
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This form of corporate welfare needs to
stop, and only the federal government
has an incentive to do so. We must end it
by considering any financial benefit
provided to a company to entice local
investment, or relocation, to be special
income that is taxed at 100 percent.
General investment by a locality to be
more business-friendly is fine, but no
more bribing companies to do
something they were already planning
to do. The only ones who win are the
companies.
We agree with the underlying premise of
this proposal, namely that the states and
localities are trapped in a race to the bottom and
that the federal government can and should
intervene. We have even argued that doing so
would not only be in the national interest
generally, but in the federal government’s
interest as a financial matter because this kind
of harmful competition ultimately costs the
federal government and states and localities
because of the phenomenon we call tax
2
cannibalization.
To review our earlier argument regarding
tax cannibalization and tax incentives, the
higher a state’s tax rate is on a shared base, say
the corporate income tax base, the more
revenue the federal government loses from
taxpayers’ actions to avoid paying what is
essentially a combined federal-state tax rate.
Put more concretely, here is a simple and
simplified example. Suppose a corporation
engages in additional profit shifting out of the
United States because of the additional 8.84
percent corporate tax imposed by California. If
the corporation shields $1 million in additional
profits, California loses $88,400 of tax revenues.
The federal fisc potentially loses $210,000
because the rate at the federal level is 21
percent.
Now consider what happens when states
provide tax incentives against tax bases that
they share with the federal government. To
meet their revenue targets, states must levy
2

David Gamage and Darien Shanske, “Tax Cannibalization and State
Government Tax Incentive Programs,” State Tax Notes, Oct. 17, 2016, p.
197.
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higher tax rates than they would otherwise
need absent these special tax incentives. Thus,
in order to provide tax incentives to some
taxpayers, states are likely cannibalizing the
federal base more as to most taxpayers. So there
is a financial reason for the federal government
to care about state tax incentives.
We applaud Yang’s proposal because it
shows considerable sophistication about state
and local finance. Specifically, the proposal
observes that, as a general matter, tax policy at
the state and local level is more of a zero-sum
game because of balanced budget constraints.
As for our analysis of the substance of Yang’s
proposal, we think that his proposed federal tax
rate of 100 percent is too high.
Consider that a 100 percent tax rate is
effectively an outright prohibition, which raises
3
constitutional concerns. The federal government
forbids the states from taxing many specific
activities, typically involving interstate
commerce. We think — and think most scholars
think — that these prohibitions are on solid
ground. By contrast, we think — and again think
that most other scholars also think — that were
the federal government to legislate a broad
prohibition against states using a specific tax base,
especially one already in use, like the corporate
income tax, this would go too far. Our reasons for
4
these conclusions are elaborated in prior writing.
Applying this analysis to Yang’s proposal, a
prohibition on targeted subsidies is clearly
somewhere in the middle ground between these
two extremes. That is, we think the
constitutionality of Yang’s proposal for a 100
percent tax rate is uncertain. On this point, note
that our reading of NFIB v. Sebelius suggests that
an otherwise unobjectionable exercise of one of
the federal government’s powers (in the case of
Yang’s proposal, the taxing power) can go too far
and thus can become unconstitutional if it would
overly undermine the fiscal operations of states.5
We think a more modest tax rate as applied to

3

For related discussion of the limits of the federal government’s
power to restrict state governments’ exercise of tax and spending
powers, see Gamage and Shanske, “The Federal Government’s Power to
Restrict State Taxation,” State Tax Notes, Aug. 15, 2016, p. 547.
4
5

Id.
Id. at 553.
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targeted subnational financial incentives would
be on reasonably sound constitutional footing but
that a 100 percent tax rate arguably goes too far.
To elaborate, imagine that a city is desperate
to keep its local sports franchise and wants to
offer financial incentives to do so. The Yang
proposal would effectively forbid this at any
price. Yet even agreeing that it is typically bad
policy for cities to bribe sports teams in this
manner, it is not clear whether the federal
government either has — or should have — the
power to completely ban subnational
governments from engaging in this sort of
behavior.
Under the federal constitutional framework,
state and local governments are supposed to
compete through policy experiments, to further
their operating as laboratories of democracy.
Industrial policy experiments should arguably
be part of this. Moreover, it can be difficult to
distinguish between subnational financial
incentives that would be subject to Yang’s tax
and the provision of public goods by
subnational governments that are especially
valued by some potentially mobile actors that
the subnational governments wish to attract or
6
retain. The higher the tax rate, the greater the
pressure on this distinction and the more
potential the tax will have to undermine
subnational governments that seek to offer
desirable public goods that just happen to be
especially attractive to certain mobile actors.
If a 100 percent tax rate or a complete ban
were the federal government’s only options to
deter bad behavior by state and local
governments of the sort that Yang is concerned
with, then we would perhaps be less worried
about these constitutional concerns. But a lower
tax rate (say, perhaps, 50 percent) would serve
policy goals far better than an outright ban
created by a 100 percent tax rate.
To elaborate, from a national perspective,
the primary concern underlying Yang’s
proposal is that state and local tax incentives
can generate a race to the bottom because each
incentive imposes an externality on competing

state and local governments that may then lose
desired business and other activities unless
they match the offered incentive. In this light, a
sensible goal for federal government policy
would be to correct this externality. As has long
been understood, the best way to correct an
externality is through a tax rate set to price the
externality, not through a ban.7
Pricing these externalities correctly through
a federal-level tax on subnational tax incentives
potentially achieves two goals. First, the
federal-level tax should deter state and local
governments from providing tax incentives
unless the subnational government has a strong
interest in doing so. Second, regarding
subnational tax incentives that are provided
anyway, the fact that the parties are willing to
pay the federal-level tax is a strong indicator
that the project is worthwhile from a national
perspective. And should there be such projects,
the federal-level tax will generate a pot of
money that can be used to mitigate the harm
being done. For instance, these federal revenues
could be dedicated to helping disadvantaged
communities that cannot enter the competition
to begin with.
We have commented on Yang’s proposal
because it is a refreshing and smart engagement
with state and local tax issues and one that we
wish to encourage. The Yang proposal reflects
the important fact that many — arguably most
— core government services are provided at the
state and local levels. Therefore, the fiscal
health of these governments is of national
importance and should be a matter for debate at
the national level. There are numerous other
ways that the federal government can improve
state and local finance. We will conclude with a
few ideas that we hope will also make it into the
national political conversation:
8
• restore a reformed SALT deduction;
• provide support so that states can improve
9
their sales taxes and impose a VAT;

7

For explanation and discussion, see Gamage and Shanske, “Tax
Cannibalization and Fiscal Federalism in the United States,” 111(2) Nw.
U. L. Rev. 295, 356-61 (2017).
8

Gamage and Shanske, “The Future of SALT: A Broader Picture,”
State Tax Notes, June 25, 2018, p. 1275.
6

We discuss this difficulty and possible ways of addressing it in a
prior writing: Gamage and Shanske, supra note 2.

9

Gamage and Shanske, “Tax Cannibalization and Fiscal Federalism
in the United States,” supra note 7, at 364-67.
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• revive the estate tax credit;
• repeal Public Law 86-272;11
12
• support state rainy day funds; and
• resurrect the Advisory Committee on
Intergovernmental Relations so that there is
a mechanism by which the federal
government can learn what is really
happening at the state and local levels.13

10

See Jeffrey A. Cooper, “Interstate Competition and State Death
Taxes: A Modern Crisis in Historical Perspective,” 33(4) Pepp. L. Rev. 835
(2006).
11

Shanske, “State Tax Administrators: Please Do Your Part in Sending
P.L. 86-272 Off Into the Sunset,” Medium, July 5, 2019.
12

Brian D. Galle and Kirk J. Stark, “Beyond Bailouts: Federal Tools for
Preventing State Budget Crises,” 87(2) Indiana L. J. 599 (2012).
13

Bruce D. McDowell, “Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations in 1996: The End of an Era,” 27(2) Publius: J. Federalism 111, 11314 (1997).
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